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Introduction
When recruiting participants for research, it is impor-
tant to ensure high response rates from an unbiased 
population [1]. One way of recruiting is to actively 
inform potential participants about the study and ask 
if they are willing to consent to participate – also 
known as ‘opt-in’. Another way to recruit is to pre-
sume consent. This approach can be combined with 
an opt-out system in which those who genuinely do 
not wish to participate must actively decline. As a 
consequence, opt-out systems typically imply trans-
ferring the obligation to act onto those who wish to 
abstain from participation. Opt-out systems often 
generate higher participation rates and a more repre-
sentative population than opt-in systems and are 
therefore preferred by many researchers [1–3]. In the 
literature, when studies of public opinion find 
opposition to presumed consent, adding an opt-out 
option tends to be presented as a solution [4,5].
We describe the rise and fall of a particular Danish 
opt-out system. To understand the nature of this sys-
tem, it is important to comprehend the Danish regis-
ter structure. All citizens in Denmark are assigned a 
unique 10-digit civil registration (CPR) number and 
this number is recorded in the Central Person Register 
(CPR). The CPR contains information about name, 
address, gender, marital status, birth, citizenship, kin-
ship, membership of the Danish church, possible legal 
incapacity and whether or not this information is 
accessible to others. The individual CPR number is 
used in practically all contacts with public (and many 
private) services and, by making all the data traceable 
for each individual person, the CPR number facilitates 
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combinations of all other registers covering health, 
education, employment and income. Data from health 
encounters are routinely transferred to national regis-
ters using the individual’s CPR number [6,7]. This 
pervasive registration of citizens has made some con-
sider the entire country of Denmark a cohort study 
[8]. As other scandinavian countries share many fea-
tures of the Danish register structure [9], it is particu-
larly relevant for scandinavian researchers to learn 
from this Danish case of a register-based opt-out sys-
tem. Opt-out systems are increasingly discussed and 
recommended internationally [10,11].
In Denmark, researchers can conduct register-
based studies on the Danish population using the 
CPR number without the consent of the participants 
and without it being possible for people to opt out. 
However, from 1995 to 2014, it was possible for 
Danish citizens to register a version of opt-out called 
‘researcher protection’ [forskerbeskyttelse] in relation 
to their CPR number. Researcher protection meant 
that researchers, who would otherwise have used the 
CPR to identify participants for research, could not 
contact them. It thereby mainly affected the recruit-
ment of research participants and hindered surveys 
based on CPR numbers. It also affected people 
recruited for research in other ways – for example, in 
the course of clinical care, because if someone was 
under researcher protection, then researchers could 
not combine register-based information with their 
clinical participation, irrespectively of their clinically 
given consent [12]. However, researcher protection 
did not affect the continual registering of data on citi-
zens and it was still possible for researchers to include 
people under researcher protection in purely regis-
ter-based studies without consent.
We know very little about how opt-out systems 
operate in practice. Most studies of register-based 
opt-out systems have been conducted either as com-
parative trials between opt-out and opt-in systems in 
relation to specific medical data or electronic health 
journals, or as studies of attitudes towards opt-out 
systems [1–3,13]. Case studies of long-term opera-
tional opt-out systems embedded in healthcare sys-
tems are limited. We present a brief analysis of the 
rise and fall of a Danish opt-out system to illustrate 
some central caveats worth considering before other 
healthcare systems embark on the introduction of 
opt-out systems for research.
Methods
We conducted a descriptive analysis of the accessible 
data on researcher protection – primarily, a copy of 
the former researcher protection register, acquired 
through statistics Denmark, where a copy was 
retained according to legal statutes aimed at ensuring 
historical documentation. Because of the CPR, we 
were able to link the registrations of researcher pro-
tection to demographic information on the popula-
tion, including sex, age, socioeconomic status and 
municipality. We were interested in how many people 
were under researcher protection, characterized by 
their demographic variables, and how registrations to 
researcher protection developed throughout the 
period. The data were analysed using the sPss ver-
sion 22 software available at statistics Denmark. We 
also analysed all political documents concerning the 
inception and the abolishment of researcher protec-
tion available on the website of the Danish Parliament 
[14,15] and looked into any media debate covering 
researcher protection using an online media monitor-
ing system [16]. Both the political documents and the 
media debate were analysed using Madden’s thematic 
coding principles [17], thereby allowing us to focus 
on the arguments in both the inception and the later 
abolishment of researcher protection. Our aims were 
to answer the following questions: how did this Danish 
opt-out system arise, why was it terminated and what 
can we learn from this piece of history?
results
The researcher protection register was created in 
1995 through an addition to the law regulating the 
CPR [18]. The only documented reason for the crea-
tion of researcher protection is that it came about in 
response to requests from three citizens who had 
expressed concerns about being identified by 
researchers through records using their CPR number 
[19]. The legal note states how citizens who have 
‘name and address protection’ (a one-year protection 
of their name and address from disclosure to private 
individuals) would also automatically get researcher 
protection. The purpose of the opt-out system was 
not stated and, without a clear purpose, there was no 
basis for evaluation.
In spring 2014, the Danish Parliament revoked 
the part of the law that referred to the researcher pro-
tection register, effectively withdrawing the register 
from use. With this revocation, all Danish citizens 
could therefore again be contacted by researchers 
after being identified through the CPR register. At 
the point of revocation, about 900,000 citizens were 
registered under researcher protection. even though, 
in principle, it affected many citizens, the revocation 
of the law and the consequent withdrawal of the reg-
ister never caused any substantial political or public 
debate.
The register on researcher protection was some-
what disorganized and it had clearly not been 
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scrutinized either during or after its operational period. 
We were informed that we were the first researchers to 
look into it. Consequently, the number of citizens who 
had opted out by registering under researcher protec-
tion cannot be determined with absolute certainty, but 
our calculations suggest that it consisted of 903,779 
citizens when the register was abolished from use in 
2014, about 16% of the Danish population.
From 1995 to 2014, the register thus increased 
significantly. However, it was not a linear increase 
throughout this period (see Figure 1). The increase 
coincided with a change in the practice of adminis-
trating the registrations. In 2000, the administrative 
responsibility for maintaining the researcher protec-
tion register shifted from the state to the municipali-
ties. As the municipalities already administered the 
aforementioned name and address protection, the 
municipalities decided to administer the researcher 
protection in the same way. In May 2000, it was 
added as a separate ‘tick-off ’ option on a paper form, 
which was mandatory for citizens to fill in whenever 
changing address. With this new administrative prac-
tice, many Danish citizens now incidentally encoun-
tered the researcher protection option. In addition, 
the person filling in the paper form could simultane-
ously register other members of their household, 
effectively opting out on their behalf. If citizens had 
name and address protection, then they would auto-
matically be granted researcher protection, but 
whereas name and address protection was opera-
tional for only one year, researcher protection was for 
life. From 1995 to mid-2000, the majority of regis-
trations for researcher protection were a consequence 
of name and address protection. However, from mid-
2000, when researcher protection was added to the 
paper form for changing address, only about 10% of 
the registrations to researcher protection were due to 
name and address protection.
In 2007, a group of scientists drew attention to the 
growing researcher protection register and it was 
decided to remove researcher protection from the 
paper form [20]. The registrations to researcher pro-
tection continued, but not at the same rate. However, 
as Figure 1 shows, the register was already approach-
ing 800,000 citizens by 2007. The high number of reg-
istrations posed a threat to the possibility of conducting 
CPR-based research recruitment. Consequently, respond-
ing to requests from researchers, the Danish Parliament 
in 2014 passed an Act abolishing the researcher 
protection register from use. The argument for this 
abolition was ‘in consideration of the possibility of 
completing representative research’ [21].
Discussion
The unfortunate Danish experience with an opt-out 
system that became so prevalent that it needed to be 
abolished contains several lessons worth considering 
before endorsing opt-out as the preferred measure in 
pursuit of high participation rates in research. The 
researcher protection register, in many ways, grew 
because it was easy to register, but this ease of regis-
tration was probably in conflict with ensuring the 
genuineness of the wishes of those registering. Most 
importantly, however, the inception in 1995, as well 
as the 2014 abolition, appear to be quick-fix solu-
tions without adequate contemplation either of the 
purpose or of the criteria of success for the researcher 
protection register as an opt-out system. If the pur-
pose were to ensure public legitimacy, the sudden 
abolition must be said to be unfortunate. likewise, if 
the purpose of researcher protection was to respect 
the autonomy of individual citizens, then it can be 
considered as a triple failure: those entering the reg-
ister might not have been aware of the implications of 
registration; some were unknowingly registered by 
Figure 1. number of citizens under researcher protection.
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others; and the abolition of the register constituted a 
new way of overruling the recorded wishes of those 
who were aware of these implications. We support 
this claim with four main arguments.
First, name and address protection was responsi-
ble for a share of the registrations to researcher pro-
tection. Therefore some citizens under researcher 
protection had not actively applied for it and would 
not have known that they were registered with a life-
long opposition to being contacted by researchers as 
a consequence of a one-year registration for name 
and address protection.
second, about 25% of the people registered under 
researcher protection were under the age of 18 years, 
which is the age of majority in Denmark. This indi-
cates that some people came under lifelong researcher 
protection when their parents registered whole fami-
lies on the change of address form. As a consequence, 
the proportion of people over 18 years of age who 
were under researcher protection not caused by name 
and address protection was only 10% before 
researcher protection was on the change of address 
form, 70% from 2001 to 2008 and around 40% from 
2008 to 2014.
Third, throughout the period, the available infor-
mation on what researcher protection entailed was 
limited. On the change of address form, researcher 
protection was explained with just 35 words placed in 
a small box on the back of the form (a separate page 
from where box should be filled in) (Figure 2). This 
short text can be interpreted in multiple ways and, 
had it been a part of a consent process, it would not 
have been considered adequate information accord-
ing to standards set by the Helsinki Declaration [22].
Fourth, this opt-out system did not prevent the 
use of health data in other forms of register-based 
research. In this way, it did not allow citizens to opt 
out of research participation completely, it only 
deprived citizens of an opportunity to opt in to fur-
ther research. As such, it was a false label all the way 
through.
Before the researcher protection register was abol-
ished in 2014, the details and opportunities of the 
register were never looked into; close scrutiny of the 
recorded entries to the register could have led to a 
consideration of changes in its administration as an 
alternative to its total abolition.
Conclusions
In many ways, the fate of this Danish opt-out system 
illustrates some of the potential pitfalls when imple-
menting opt-out in a system for research recruitment 
otherwise depending on presumed consent. From its 
inception, during its administration and as it was 
revoked, this opt-out system was marked by ad hoc 
solutions without any clear purpose and a lack of cri-
teria for, and processes of, evaluation. To make mat-
ters worse, the register was abolished and therefore 
effectively deleted without being scrutinized and 
without informing the people registered or providing 
them with alternatives.
What might we learn from these mistakes? For a 
start, a clear purpose for the system and a process for 
monitoring and evaluating it would have been useful. 
If the pupose of the policy was to enhance autonomy, 
other improvements could have included better 
information prior to registration, and limits to regis-
trations so that only competent individuals could 
register themselves. The practice of lifelong registra-
tion rests on the idea that a person retains the same 
attitude(s) towards research participation through-
out their whole life. This might be unfounded. A 
person might think opt-out sounds appealing at the 
age of 20 and feel differently when confronted with 
cancer at the age of 55. should opt-out be aimed at 
respecting autonomy, it might be valuable for future 
systems to implement invitations to reconsider at 
certain intervals. In short, when other healthcare sys-
tems consider implementing opt-out systems, we rec-
ommend that they first consider the fallacies of this 
Danish experience.
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